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Abstract
This paper argues that the e±ciency distribution of players in a game determines how
aggressively these players interact. We formalize the idea of balance of power: players
¯ght very ine±cient players but play softly versus equally (or more) e±cient players. This
theory of conduct predicts that entry by new ¯rms leads to a less aggressive outcome if it
creates a balance of power. A balance of power is created if more players get technologies
that are close to the most e±cient technology. Using a related argument, we show that
an increase in entry costs can lead to more aggressive outcomes.
Keywords: pricing games, Folk theorem, re¯nement of predicted outcomes, su-
pergames, contestable market
J.E.L. codes: D43, C72, L41
1. Introduction
An important determinant of how aggressively agents behave is the response their behavior
will elicit from other agents. If you expect an aggressive response from your opponent you
tend to behave more friendly than when your opponent is so weak that he cannot retaliate if
you increase your utility at his expense. This idea that a balance of power in e±ciency levels
causes less aggressive behavior leads to the surprising comparative static result that entry by
new players into the game can lead to a less aggressive outcome instead of a more aggressive
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1one. More precisely, if n1 denotes the highest e±ciency level in the game, then entry which
increases the number of ¯rms with e±ciency n1 creates a balance of power and hence leads to
a less aggressive outcome. In terms of a pricing game: such entry leads to higher equilibrium
prices.
This idea of balance of power is not con¯ned to economic examples with competing ¯rms.
Casual observation suggests a number of other examples. To illustrate, most people have the
experience of rather dull sport matches at the highest level. For instance, boring soccer games
for the world championship. Flat stages in the Tour de France cycling competition where hardly
anyone attacks and the winner is determined in the ¯nal sprint. In contrast, mountain stages
in the same cycling contest are full of action and attacks. The explanation for these phenomena
stressed in this paper is that aggressive actions do not pay o® if the di®erences between players
or teams are small. However, if the di®erences in ability are big, as in the mountain stages,
aggressive behavior is more rewarding. Also, over time it appears that more and more °at
stages are won in the ¯nal sprint and not by groups breaking away from the bunch of riders.
Paradoxically, some commentators explain this by their observation that the number of top
quality cyclists has increased. This is the crowding e®ect explained below. Intuitively, the
more high quality riders there are which can counterattack, the less likely it becomes that a
break away group can be successful. Hence we see fewer attacks in °at stages now than, say, ten
years ago. Finally, the balance of power between the US and USSR created a cold war instead
of a real one. At the same time, these two countries were picking ¯ghts with adversaries that
appeared a lot weaker to them.
Economic evidence suggesting that simple Bertrand and Cournot models may be missing
something is, for instance, the empirical ¯nding on the relation between entry and prices (as
in Knetter (1994), Geroski (1989) and Klette (1999)). This relation is not as strong as tra-
ditional Cournot and Bertrand models would predict. This evidence is only suggestive and
2the reason why there is no direct evidence is that -to the best of our knowledge- no paper
tries to explain the observed outcome by the dispersion of e±ciency levels. To illustrate, the
traditional structure-conduct-performance approach (as in Ravencraft (1987) and Schmalensee
(1985)) tried to predict the price level of an industry on the basis of the ¯rst moment of the cost
distribution (and other factors) but not on the basis of higher moments. Hence the empirical
implication of our paper is that the shape of the e±ciency distribution is important, not just
the average e±ciency level.
Although the results below are derived for a general class of games (pay o® structures),
an important subclass is pricing games. For the purpose of illustration we consider a pricing
game with homogenous good ¯rms each producing with constant marginal costs. As is well
known (see, for instance, Tirole (1988)) there are two extreme predictions here, neither of
which is fully satisfactory. On the one hand, we have the Bertrand Nash equilibrium. It's
two main disadvantages are: (i) two ¯rms with zero ¯xed costs is enough to get the outcome
with price equal to marginal costs; (ii) any positive ¯xed or entry cost leads to the monopoly
price. It is hard to believe that two ¯rms are enough to get such a competitive outcome.
The price discontinuity in ¯xed costs also seems unlikely. Surely, the outcome of the market
should not di®er much between zero entry cost and an entry cost equal to, say, one dollar. On
the other hand, in a repeated game setting we have the Folk theorem. If players put enough
weight on future pay o®s any price between the Nash equilibrium price and the monopoly
price can be sustained by trigger strategies. Since 'anything goes' in this case, comparative
static exercises become hard and sometimes meaningless. The main result from the traditional
literature stresses the e®ect that entry in such games makes cooperation harder and tends to
reduce the maximum sustainable price. We will derive conditions under which entry leads to a
higher price.
In the supergame tradition, there is a recent literature by Rothschild (1999), Compte, Jenny
3and Rey (2002) and Vasconcelos (2002). These papers establish that more symmetric ¯rms (in
terms of marginal cost levels, production capacities and capital) can more easily sustain the
fully collusive outcome. More precisely, as the industry becomes more symmetric (along the
mentioned dimensions) there is a bigger set of discount factors for which the maximal collusive
price can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium. This is related to our paper, as we
also ¯nd that the e±ciency distribution (not just the average e±ciency level) is an important
determinant of the outcome.
The main di®erence between these results and our approach is the following. We assume that
players put enough weight on the future that the most collusive outcome is always sustainable.
Then we ask which of the set of prices 'predicted' by the Folk theorem are plausible. We re¯ne
the set of sustainable prices by focusing on outcomes Preferred by E±cient Players (PEP).
The following example illustrates the main point. Consider a consumer who is willing to buy
(at most) one product at a reserve (maximum) price equal to 1 (one). There are three ¯rms
in the market, two with marginal costs equal to 0 and one with marginal costs equal to 0.9.
Assume that ¯xed costs are equal to zero. If this game is repeated (in some way; details follow
below) and ¯rms value the future enough, the set of prices [0,1] is sustainable as subgame
perfect equilibrium prices. Consider the price equal to 1: the two (most) e±cient ¯rms make
an expected pro¯t equal to 0.33 (assuming that the consumer randomizes between three ¯rms
charging the same price). If the price is reduced to 0.9, these two ¯rms make (expected) pro¯ts
equal to 0.45. Now what stops these ¯rms from charging the lower (limit) price p = 0:9?
Nothing actually; the only ¯rm that loses from charging the lower price cannot (credibly)
retaliate as it is priced out of the market. Hence the folk theorem does not rule out a price
equal to one, but we do because the p = 1 is not preferred by the e±cient players. It is not a
PEP outcome.
Below we de¯ne and further discuss PEP outcomes. Here we note two things. First, consider
4the case where three players are supposed to play p = 1 can they actually get to a lower price?
They can, if they play the following 'clever' trigger strategies (instead of the standard ones).
Suppose one of your opponents undercuts the current price p = 1 to p0. If at this lower price
your expected discounted pro¯ts are actually higher than they were at the original price, then
charge p0 from then onward (and do not revert to playing Bertrand Nash). If the new price
p0 yields lower expected discounted pro¯ts than p then revert to playing Bertrand Nash from
then onward. These trigger strategies allow the e±cient ¯rms to get to a price equal to 0:9
without triggering a punishment phase. Alternatively, one can argue that if three ¯rms can
coordinate on a price equal to p = 1 and on the required punishment strategies, why is it not
feasible for the two e±cient ¯rms to get together and agree on the lower, more pro¯table, price?
In many scenarios it seems realistic to assume that the e±cient ¯rms will be able to do just
that and hence focussing on PEP outcomes is reasonable. Second, the point is to distinguish
between two types of deviations (a distinction that the folk theorem does not make). A ¯rm
which just (slightly) undercuts the current price to gain the whole market at the expense of its
opponents is di®erent from a ¯rm that reduces the price to one where all the remaining ¯rms
are actually better o®. In the former case punishment is called for, in the latter case it is not.
Put di®erently, in the latter case, the ¯rm can even announce its price reduction beforehand
and the price cut is still pro¯table; in the former case this is clearly not true. The 'clever'
trigger strategies discussed above take this distinction into account.
The comparative statics exercise that we stress here is that a balance of power can be created
through entry. This is a comparative static exercise on the set of PEP outcomes. It can be
illustrated as follows. Suppose a price reduction ¢p = ¡10 reduces the number of opponents
by 5. Then this may well be pro¯table for the e±cient ¯rms in the industry if there are 10
¯rms to start with. However, if the reduction in the number of ¯rms is from 105 to 100, this
is less likely to be pro¯table for the e±cient ¯rms. Hence in the former case the low price is a
5PEP outcome, but not in the latter case. This we call a balance of power through crowding.
Finally, we would like to mention two strands of literature that are related to our work.
First, the literature on dynamic games which are not supergames. Maskin and Tirole (1988)
consider a game where ¯rms commit to a price for a certain period. This leads to reaction lags
which can sustain prices above the Bertrand equilibrium price. Their main interest is price
dynamics (e.g. possibilities of cycles) and not comparative statics with respect to industry
structure (they focus on the case of symmetric duopoly). Farm and Weibull (1987) consider a
rapid response game, which can be seen as a special case of the model introduced below. First,
in their model all ¯rms are symmetric while we allow for asymmetries between ¯rms. Second,
in their model ¯rms can react with probability 1 (one) to price changes of opponents while in
our model this probability can be less than one as well.
Second, there is a literature that considers situations where entry by a new ¯rm raises the
equilibrium price. In Stiglitz (1989) the entry of a new ¯rm makes the market less transparent,
which raises the equilibrium price. Amir and Lambson (2000) derive conditions on demand
and cost structures such that entry in a symmetric Cournot equilibrium leads to higher prices.
Finally, Bulow and Klemperer (2002) consider an (almost) common value auction where entry
by a bidder leads to lower expected revenue. The intuition is that with more bidders the
winner's curse gets worse and hence all bidders shade their bids more strongly after entry.
Interestingly, in their set up the entrant is feared to have a low valuation (bad news about
the common value) while we ¯nd the balance of power result in case of a high valuation (high
e±ciency entrant).
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the framework used in
this paper, in particular the pay o® functions, the dynamic structure of the game and the
de¯nition of a PEP outcome. Section 3 considers the PEP outcome for a simple pricing game
and illustrates the main results in the paper. Section 4 derives conditions under which entry
6leads to a less aggressive outcome. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes. All
proofs are in the appendix.
2. Model and PEP outcome
Consider a static game with N players. We order players in terms of their e±ciency, with ¯rm
1 being the most e±cient: n1 ¸ n2 ¸ ::: ¸ nN. Each player chooses an action ai from a
bounded subset of IR
m (to ease notation, we work with m = 1), where higher values of ai are
interpreted as more aggressive actions. We assume that there exists a continuous real valued
function G(a1;:::;aN) which summarizes the e®ect of all players actions on a player's pay o®
where
@G(a1;:::;aN)
@ai ¸ 0 for each i. In particular, we assume that player i's pay o® can be written
as ¼(ai;A;º;ni) where A = G(a1;:::;aN) and º · N is the number of active players (see
below). The value of A is referred to as the aggregate aggression level.
This implies that it does not matter for player i how the di®erent actions are distributed
over the di®erent players, the only pay o® relevant information is the aggregate aggression
outcome A. In the pricing example introduced in the introduction, the aggregate aggression
outcome is the lowest price charged by any ¯rm in the market. The number of active ¯rms º
is then the number of ¯rms charging this lowest price.
As another example, consider a patent race where ¯rms invest ai in R&D to be the ¯rst to
¯nd an innovation. The value of the patent to ¯rm i is denoted by ni and the costs of doing
R&D are given by c(ai). Then the pay o® structure could take the form
ai PN
j=1 ajni ¡ c(ai). In
our terminology pay o®s would be written as
ai
ºAni ¡ c(ai) where º is the number of ¯rms with
positive investments (aj > 0) and A = 1
º
P
j aj is the average investment level of the ¯rms that
do invest in R&D.
We make the following assumptions on the pay o® structure.
7Assumption 1 (i) The function ¼(ai;A;º;ni) is continuous in ai and A.
If ¼(ai;A;º;ni) > 0 then
(ii) ¼(ai;A;º;ni) is decreasing in A;
(iii) ¼(ai;A;º;ni) is decreasing in º;
(iv) ¼(ai;A;º;ni) is increasing in ni.
Further, ¼(ai;A;º + x;ni) ¡ ¼(a0
i;A0;º + x;ni) 6= 0 implies
(v) limx!+1
¼(ai;A;º+x;ni)¡¼(ai;A;º0+x;ni)
¼(ai;A;º+x;ni)¡¼(a0
i;A0;º+x;ni) = 0;
Assumption 1 (ii) states that more aggressive outcomes (for given action ai and given
number of active players) reduce i's pay o®s. Assumption (iii) says that it is better to have
a smaller number of opponents to share the pay o®s with. Assumption (iv) de¯nes e±ciency:
higher ni leads to higher pay o®s. The next assumption introduces the idea of 'sharing games'.
Keeping the action ai and the aggregate aggression level A constant, assumption (iii) implies
that lower º yields higher pay o®s. However, the di®erence in pay o® between sharing with
º + x and º0 + x ¯rms goes to zero as x goes to in¯nity faster than a pay o® di®erence with
the same number of ¯rms (º +x). As one can easily verify, this is, for instance, the case if pay
o®s are of the form
S(ai;A;ni)
º ¡ c(ai;A;ni) where S(:) is a sales or revenue function and c(:) a
cost function. Hence the pricing examples used in this paper have this property. The reason is
that @¼
@º = ¡
S(ai;A;ni)
º2 goes to zero faster as º increases than
@S(ai;A;ni)
@ai
1
º and
@S(ai;A;ni)
@A
1
º do.
This static game with pay o®s ¼(ai;A;º;ni) is embedded in the following dynamic structure.
Each period players choose actions ai. With a probability q these pay o®s are realized in this
period and the game ends. With probability 1 ¡ q the pay o®s are not realized, the game
continues and players can react to the actions observed from their opponents. To illustrate
with a pricing game, each period ¯rms choose simultaneously and independently prices. Then
8there is a probability q that the consumer actually arrives this period and buys from one of
the ¯rms with the lowest price. In which case the game ends. With probability (1 ¡ q) the
consumer does not arrive and ¯rms can adjust their prices in response to the prices observed in
the current period.1 In a patent race model, the idea is that ¯rms invest in R&D every period.
With a probability q there is a scienti¯c break through and the more a ¯rm has invested, the
more likely it is to win the patent. The patent race then ends. With probability (1 ¡ q) there
is no breakthrough, the game continues and ¯rms choose how much to invest in R&D for the
next period. In terms of a simple cycling model: if you attack and sprint away from the other
riders at some point in the race, there is a probability that you are not caught and you win the
race. However, with some probability the other riders come back (say, because you had a °at
tire) and you do not necessarily win the race.
To simplify notation we assume there is no discounting (r = 0).2 We are interested in
outcomes that deviate from the Nash equilibrium. To analyze this we need to de¯ne the
set of sustainable or incentive compatible (IC) actions. In determining the set of IC actions,
we follow the literature in assuming that players use trigger strategies. If someone deviates,
players revert to playing the most aggressive (highest A) Nash equilibrium from then onwards.3
Actually, for our purposes it does not matter much what the punishment phase looks like
exactly. Alternatively, ¯rms could have punishment periods of ¯nite duration and return to
a collusive outcome afterwards. The details of the punishment strategies determine the set
of IC strategies, our interest is in which outcome in this set is actually preferred by e±cient
¯rms. The comparative statics focus on this preferred outcome, not on the set of sustainable
outcomes.
Before we de¯ne IC outcomes, let's introduce some more notation. Let ¼NE(ni) denote
1Another interpretation is that in every period a fraction of total demand is realized. Both interpretations
are equally valid.
2This is without loss of generality since q takes on the role of discount factor.
3We do not yet worry here about deviations that make all surviving players better o®. We come back to this
below.
9player i's pay o® in the (most aggressive) Nash equilibrium outcome. Further, the (static) best
response of player i to aggregate aggression level A is denoted by Ri(A). In principle, the best
reply may also depend on the number of active players, but this is suppressed to ease notation.
De¯nition 1 The set of IC actions is de¯ned as
A =
½
a
¯
¯
¯
¯
¼(ai;G(a);º(G(a));ni) ¸ q¼(Ri(G(a));G(a);º(G(a));ni)+
(1 ¡ q)¼NE(ni) 8i = 1;2;:::;º(G(a))
¾
where the number of active ¯rms º(G(a)) is determined by
º(G(a)) = max
i=f1;2;:::;Ng
fijq¼(Ri(G(a));G(a);i;ni) + (1 ¡ q)¼
NE(ni) > fg
Hence an action pro¯le a is an element of A if for all active ¯rms it is optimal to stick to a
instead of playing a best reply to G(a) and playing the Nash equilibrium from then onwards.
If a player deviates, there is a probability q that pay o®s are realized and the deviator gets
¼(Ri(G(a));G(a);i;ni). With probability 1 ¡ q pay o®s are not realized and the deviator gets
the Nash equilibrium pay o® ¼NE(ni).4 The number of active ¯rms º(G(a)) is determined as
follows. Firm i cannot be kept out of the market if it is pro¯table for i to deviate and enter. If
i is supposed to stay out and yet enters, there is a probability q that pay o®s are realized and
he gets ¼(R(G(a));G(a);i;ni). With probability 1 ¡ q pay o®s are not realized in that period
and i gets the Nash equilibrium pay o® from then onward. If these expected pro¯ts exceed the
entry cost f, player i cannot be kept out of the market. Note the similarity between this and
the hit-and-run entrant in contestable market theory (Baumol (1982) and Baumol and Willig
(1981)). We come back to this below. If the expected pro¯ts do not exceed f then ¯rm i cannot
pro¯tably enter.
4Note that with a discount rate r > 0 the weights on the pro¯ts would be
r+q
1+r and
1¡q
1+r resp. As these
weights add up to one as well, it is without loss of generality that we focus on the case with r = 0.
10De¯nition 2 We say that an aggregate aggression level A is sustainable if there exists a 2 A
with G(a) = A.
With this de¯nition we can make the ¯nal assumption on the pay o® structure.
Assumption 2 Take two sustainable A and A0 < A with º(A) < º(A0). Then for each a 2 A
with G(a) = A there exists a0 2 A with G(a0) = A0 such that
¼(a
0
i;A
0;º(A);ni) > ¼(ai;A;º(A);ni)
for each i = 1;:::;º(A).
This assumption generalizes the idea in Assumption 1 (ii) that a lower aggregate aggression
level A is more pro¯table. In particular, in Assumption 1 we consider the partial e®ect of A
for given a. However, if all ai are kept constant, we cannot have a di®erent value of A. Hence,
assumption 2 states that if A is reduced while the number of ¯rms is kept constant at º(A)
then we can always ¯nd a0 such that the most e±cient ¯rms are better o® at the reduced
level A0 = G(a0) than they are at the more aggressive level A. In the pricing example of the
introduction where a consumer buys at most one product, this can be illustrated as follows. A
¯rm with cost level ci < p has pro¯ts equal to
p¡ci
º given that it shares the market with º ¡ 1
competitors. The assumption says that at a higher price p0 > p (less aggressive outcome) we
can ¯nd an action pro¯le such that ¯rm i is better o® if the number of ¯rms is unchanged. In
this example, this assumption holds (trivially) since
p0¡ci
º >
p¡ci
º for each ¯rm i with ci < p.
Now we introduce the equilibrium concept used in this paper. We say that an action pro¯le
a is a Preferred by E±cient Players (PEP) outcome if there is no other action pro¯le a0 such
that the ¯rms that are active under both outcomes prefer a0 over a. More formally, this can be
stated as follows.
11De¯nition 3 An action pro¯le a 2 A with G(a) = A is a PEP outcome if there does not exist
a0 2 A with G(a0) = A0 such that
¼(a
0
i;A
0;º(A
0);ni) ¸ ¼(ai;A;º(A);ni)
for each i = 1;:::;minfº(A);º(A0)g and with strict inequality for at least one i.
In other words, a PEP outcome has a Pareto optimality property, but not with all players
taken into account. When we compare action pro¯le a0 with a more aggressive action pro¯le
a in the sense that G(a) > G(a0), then a0 is not preferred by e±cient players if all surviving
players 1;:::;º(G(a)) are better o® under a. Since players º(G(a)) + 1;:::;º(G(a0)) see their
pay o®s reduced to zero, it is not the case that a Pareto dominates a0, but it is the case that a
is better for all the ¯rms that could potentially retaliate.
The motivation for focussing on PEP outcomes is the following. Suppose that, following
the folk theorem, we imagine that ¯rms 1;:::;º(A0) can coordinate on an action pro¯le a0 and
corresponding punishment strategies, then in many scenarios it is hard to understand what
stops a coalition of e±cient players to coordinate on an action pro¯le that makes all of these
e±cient players better o®. If the action pro¯le is determined by some bargaining procedure,
one would expect that it is easier to come to an agreement with a smaller number of players.
Hence, any outcome that can be supported as a collusive outcome in the folk theorem but that
is not a PEP outcome is discarded in this paper.
Our concept of a PEP outcome is related to the core in cooperative game theory. A PEP
outcome is one where no coalition can break away and guarantee itself a higher pay o®. We do
not pursue this relation here further to avoid technicalities.5
5In particular, the action space for a player here (who chooses an action every period) is not ¯nite dimensional
and the relation between PEP outcomes and the core only holds in the dynamic version of the game. Also we
have more structure here than in the general framework used in cooperative game theory. This allows us to
give a rather straightforward proof of existence of PEP outcomes (where we only use Weierstrass' theorem).
12Before turning to some examples of PEP outcomes, we brie°y discuss existence and unique-
ness issues.
Lemma 1 Assume that actions ai are chosen from a bounded set, and that the functions
¼(ai;A;º;ni);G(a) and Ri(A) are continuous in a and A. Then if there exists a Nash equilib-
rium for the static game, there exists a PEP outcome.
The assumption that actions are taken from a bounded set is not restrictive. In most
economic examples it is the case that there exists ai such that for all a¡i it is the case that
¼(a1;G(a1;a¡1);º(G(a1;a¡1);n1);n1) < ¼NE(n1) which cannot be optimal. In a pricing exam-
ple, if ¯rm i charges a price equal to the lowest marginal cost level in the industry, we already
have this e®ect. In an R&D race model where the aggregate aggression level is related to the
sum of the R&D investments chosen, we ¯nd the same e®ect as limai!1 G(ai;a¡i) = +1 which
cannot be optimal for a convex cost of R&D function.
The idea of the proof is to use the Weierstrass theorem on the existence of global solutions
to a particular set of optimization problems. The continuity assumptions are needed to apply
the theorem. Further, if a Nash equilibrium exists, we know that the set of IC outcomes A is
nonempty, as the Nash equilibrium itself is IC.
As we show with a simple pricing example below a PEP outcome is generally not unique.
However, this does not matter for our purposes. The comparative statics result that we want
to show is that entry can lead to a less aggressive outcome. This we will show for all PEP
outcomes. In particular, we start with a situation where all PEP outcomes feature A > A0 for
some A0 > 0. Then we prove that if enough ¯rms enter all PEP outcomes feature A < A0.
133. Pricing game examples
In this section we use the simple pricing game in the introduction to illustrate the following
results: entry by a new ¯rm can lead to a higher PEP outcome, the PEP outcome is not
necessarily unique but still we ¯nd that entry leads to a lower price. Further, we show that an
increase in entry costs can lead to a lower price and that the PEP outcome can be achieved in
a non cooperative game when players use 'clever' trigger strategies.
Consider the following simple pricing game between ¯rms producing a homogenous good.
There is one consumer who buys maximally one unit of the good and has a reservation price
equal to v > 0. Firm i = 1;:::;N has cost ci and we de¯ne ¯rm i's e±ciency level as ni = v¡ci.
Firms set prices, but we de¯ne actions in such a way that more aggressive actions are associated
with higher values. Firm i's action is de¯ned as ai = v ¡ pi. In words, ¯rm i's action is the
surplus granted to the consumer. The pay o® to ¯rm i can now be written as
¼(ai;A;º(A);ni) =
½
0 if ai < A
ni¡A
º(A) if ai = A
where A = maxfa1;:::;aNg and º(A) is the number of ¯rms choosing action A. That is, the
most aggressive ¯rm captures the whole market. If ¯rms are equally aggressive, they share the
market equally.
We embed this static game into the following dynamic structure. In each period, ¯rms
choose their actions ai. With probability q the consumer arrives and buys from the ¯rm that
grants him the highest surplus (randomizes, if necessary). After the consumer has bought the
good, the game ends. With probability (1¡q) the consumer does not arrive and ¯rms can react
to each other's actions. In the next period there is again a probability q that the consumer
arrives etc. This seems a reasonable description of, say, a high street ¯rm selling TV sets.
Each morning the ¯rm's owner decides what price tag to put on a certain TV model. If a
14consumer arrives that day, she buys the TV from one of the sellers charging the lowest price.
If the consumer does not arrive, the ¯rm's owner can change the price the next morning taking
into account the prices charged by his competitors down high street. If the probability q is
determined by the probability that the customer's old TV breaks down, it is exogenous and
does not depend on the price charged by the ¯rms. Below we also consider an example with
a downward sloping demand curve X(p). Expected sales are then qX(p) which can (under
some conditions) also be interpreted as saying that lower prices make it more likely that the
consumer arrives today.
The set of incentive compatible action pro¯les, takes a simple form in this context:
A = fAj
n1 ¡ A
º(A)
¸ q(n1 ¡ A) + (1 ¡ q)(n1 ¡ n2)g
where the number of active players is determined by
º(A) = max
i2f1;:::;Ng
fijq(ni ¡ A) > fg
Since A = maxfa1;:::;aNg all active players have ai = A otherwise they will never sell. Next,
if an action A is IC for ¯rm 1 it is IC for all active ¯rms. This is because ¯rm 1 has the biggest
incentive to deviate: the most e±cient ¯rm has the highest incentive to price low and the most
e±cient ¯rm still (potentially) makes a positive pro¯t in the Nash equilibrium played after a
deviation. If ¯rm 1 deviates he chooses an action slightly above A (slightly undercuts the price)
and captures the whole market. If the consumer does not arrive, ¯rm 2 plays a2 = n2 from
then onward and we get the Nash outcome. Finally, only ¯rms i > 1 can enter who can ¯nance
the entry cost f out of expected pro¯ts if the consumer arrives in the period of entry.
From the de¯nition of º(A), we see that the limit action (price) that keeps ¯rm i > 2 out of
the market equals A = ni¡f=q (p = ci+f=q). In other words, f=q measures how contestable a
market is. However, this does not imply that it is optimal to keep the next e±cient ¯rm 2 out.
15If ¯rm 2 is e±cient enough, the PEP outcome will exceed n2 + f=q. In other words, although
the logic of contestable markets applies in this context, it does not follow that the outcome is
necessarily a low price. This depends on the e±ciency distribution in the industry.
In this sense, the concept of a PEP outcome bridges the gap between predatory pricing
keeping ¯rm 2 out of the market and full collusion where ¯rms charge the monopoly price. The
e±ciency distribution determines which limit price is chosen, or put di®erently, the degree to
which predatory pricing is used. Alternatively, starting from the monopoly price, the e±ciency
distribution determines the degree to which the ¯rms collude. By focussing on PEP outcomes,
predatory pricing-collusion is no longer a zero-one decision.
Note that an action A that keeps a ¯rm j out with A > nj +f=q cannot be a PEP outcome:
there exists another action (A = nj+f=q) that makes all surviving ¯rms (1;:::;j¡1) better o®.
Hence below we only consider limit prices and the monopoly price (A = 0) when determining
PEP outcomes.
For all examples here we take v = 1 and n1 = 1. Other parameters are given in each
example.
Example 1 Assume that f = 0;n2 = 0:4. Hence there are only two potential PEP outcomes
A = 0 and A = 0:4. Assuming that q is small enough that both are IC, we ¯nd that the pro¯ts
for ¯rm 1 equal ¼1 = 0:5 at A = 0 and ¼1 = 0:6 at A = 0:4. Consequently, ¯rm 1 prefers to
keep 2 out of the market and be the only producer in the market. The unique PEP outcome
is A = 0:4. Now consider the entry of a new ¯rm into the market with n3 = n1 = 1. The
monopoly price, A = 0, now yields expected pro¯ts ¼1 = ¼3 = 0:33 while keeping 2 out of the
market yields ¼1 = ¼3 = 0:3. Hence, after entry by ¯rm 3, the unique PEP outcome is less
aggressive than before (A = 0 < 0:4), assuming that q is small enough that A = 0 is IC.
There are two things to note about this example. First, using the folk theorem it can also
happen that entry by a very e±cient ¯rm leads to a less aggressive outcome. This happens
16because the punishment phase can be harsher due to entry and therefore more collusive (less
aggressive) outcomes can be sustained that could not be sustained before. However, this is not
the intuition of the e®ect above. By assumption A = 0 was also IC before ¯rm 3 entered the
market. The intuition here is a balance of power through crowding. Increasing aggression from
A = 0 to 0.4 ¯rst reduced the number of ¯rms from 2 to 1. After entry the same increase in
aggression leads to a reduction in the number of ¯rms from 3 to 2 which is less pro¯table.
Second, although this paper focusses on the e®ect of entry, similar results can be derived
for e±ciency gains. To see this, assume that instead of ¯rm 3 entering, we consider a gain in
e±ciency for ¯rm 2 from n2 = 0:4 to n2 = 0:9. Such an e±ciency gain would lead to lower
prices in both a Cournot and a Bertrand model. Here, however, the PEP outcome will become
less aggressive after the e±ciency gain: A = 0 < 0:4. The intuition is that it is pro¯table for
¯rm 1 to ¯ght a rather ine±cient ¯rm (n2 = 0:4) but it is not pro¯table to ¯ght an e±cient ¯rm
with n2 = 0:9. Hence the e±ciency gain creates a balance of power that did not exist before.6
The next example shows that a PEP outcome is not necessarily unique, yet the main
comparative static result (entry can lead to less aggressive outcomes) still holds.
Example 2 Consider an industry with n2 = 0:7;n3 = 0:3;f = 0. Then it is routine to verify
that A = 0 and A = 0:3 are both PEP outcomes (1 prefers A = 0:3 over A = 0 while for 2 it is
the other way around). If a new ¯rm enters with n4 = n1 = 1 then A = 0 is the unique PEP
outcome. Hence entry, if it changes anything, leads to a less aggressive outcome.
Next we consider the e®ect of a rise in entry cost. Here we see the 'mirror image' of the
crowding e®ect. A rise in entry cost allows each limit price to rise and still keep the marginal
entrant out. This has more impact on pro¯ts if the number of active players is small. Hence,
a rise in entry costs, tends to make more aggressive outcomes relatively more attractive.
6Note that entry can also be viewed as an e±ciency gain. Firm 3 in the example above may have started
out with e±ciency level n3 = 0 and experience an e±ciency gain to n3 = 1.
17Example 3 Consider an industry with n2 = 0:65;n3 = 0:1;f=q = 0:1. Hence the relevant
limit actions are A = 0 and keep ¯rm 3 out and A = 0:55 and keep ¯rms 2 and 3 out of the
market. Clearly, A = 0 is the unique PEP outcome here. Now the entry cost f goes up such
that f=q = 0:2. Now it becomes optimal for player 1 to keep 2 out of the market by limit action
A = 0:45. Hence the rise in entry cost leads to a more aggressive outcome.
Two brief remarks on this example. First, note that the PEP outcome for f = 0 equals
A = 0:1 to keep ¯rm 3 out of the market. For small increases in f the outcome is simply the
limit action A = 0:1 ¡ f=q which is continuous in f. This is in sharp contrast to the Bertrand
outcome. Bertrand competition in this context predicts A = 0:65 for f = 0 while A = 0 for any
f > 0 no matter how small. This discontinuity is seen as a serious drawback of the Bertrand
model. It disappears when considering PEP outcomes.7
Our second remark concerns the di®erent interpretations of the entry cost f. If f is a sunk
entry cost, then the comparative static in the example should be interpreted as the comparison
between two identical industries where one has a higher entry cost. In particular, it cannot be
interpreted as a change over time in the same industry. If ¯rm 2 has already sunk its investment
f then only a limit action A = n2 = 0:65 can remove it from the industry. However, if f is
interpreted as a recurring per period ¯xed cost (e.g. cost of keeping your shop open) then an
increase in f (say, the rental rate of the shop goes up) can induce ¯rm 1 to push 2 out of the
market. In that case, the comparative static can be interpreted as happening over time within
the same industry.
We conclude this section with a discussion of the way ¯rms can get to a PEP outcome in
a noncooperative way. Suppose that ¯rms currently charge a sustainable price which is not
a PEP outcome in the sense that there is a lower price that makes all surviving ¯rms better
7Other ways in which this problem disappears is to consider heterogenous goods instead of homogenous ones,
or to assume increasing marginal costs instead of constant marginal costs in a model with a downward sloping
demand function. See Tirole (1988) for details.
18o®. Consider the case where ¯rms use the following 'clever' trigger strategies. Suppose you
are in the cooperative stage (i.e. not in a punishment phase) and you are supposed to charge
a price p. Now one of your opponents in the previous period charged p0 < p. If p0 is below
your marginal cost level, charge your marginal cost level from then onward. If p0 is above your
marginal cost level and your expected discounted pro¯ts are lower at p0 than they were at p
then play the punishment strategy (e.g. play the Nash equilibrium strategy from then onward).
If, on the other hand, your expected discounted pro¯ts are higher at p0 than they were at p,
charge p0 from then onward. In words, the 'clever' trigger strategy di®ers from the usual trigger
strategy in that it distinguishes between deviations that are pro¯table for all surviving ¯rms
and deviations that go at the expense of some of the surviving ¯rms. Firms that are forced to
exit due to the price reduction are worse o®, but they cannot retaliate.
If the deviating ¯rm can announce beforehand that it will reduce its price from p to p0,
then there is not even the risk that pay o®s will be realized (with probability q) before the
others can follow the price reduction. Hence with such announcements there is no risk that the
other ¯rms lose out because of the price reduction. As is well known, such price announcements
happen frequently in reality. Examples go back to Stigler (1947) which includes examples of pre
announcements in the cigarette and anthracite industries. Adams and Brock (2001) describe
the price announcements in the US car and airline industries. Recent European antitrust
cases where, for instance, trade associations made 'price recommendations' include the Dutch
concrete industry, German ¯re insurers and Belgian manufacturers and importers of tobacco.8
Hence it seems that it is relatively straightforward for ¯rms to get to a PEP outcome in a
noncooperative way. Admittedly, this is simplest in a pricing game, where a ¯rm either charges
the lowest price in the market or exits the market. In a more general game, ¯rms need to
coordinate both on A and on the vector of actions a that leads to A = G(a), which is harder.
8The cases are Cementhandelaren v. Commission [1972] ECR977, Verband der Sachversicherer v. Commis-
sion [1987] ECR405 and Van Landewyck v. Commission [1980] ECR3125.
194. The e®ect of entry on the PEP outcome
In this section we derive su±cient conditions under which entry by e±cient ¯rms leads to a
less aggressive PEP outcome. Next we derive for a pricing game with a more general demand
function than the one used in the examples above that an increase in the entry cost f tends to
lead to more aggressive outcomes.
The next proposition derives that if enough e±cient ¯rms enter the market, the outcome
becomes less aggressive. Although we derive this as a limit result, the examples above have
shown that it is easy to ¯nd cases where one ¯rm entering can be enough to get this result. Note
that we (simply) assume that q is small enough that the less aggressive outcomes are IC. Hence,
the relevant e®ect here is not that entry allows for harsher punishments and therefore makes
more collusive outcomes possible. By assumption the more collusive outcomes are (always)
possible, they are just not preferred by e±cient ¯rms.
Proposition 1 Consider a game with N players where n1 ¸ ::: ¸ nN and f=q ¸ 0. Assume
that there exists A0 > 0 such that initially any A < A0 is not a PEP outcome. Then there
exists x ¸ 0 such that if x > x ¯rms enter with e±ciency level n1 then any A > A0 cannot be
a PEP outcome (assuming q is small enough that at least one A < A0 is sustainable).
This shows that entry by e±cient ¯rms leads to a less aggressive outcome. Initially, all PEP
outcomes have an aggregate aggression level above A0 > 0.9 After entry, all PEP outcomes lie
below A0 (assuming that lemma 1 applies and a PEP outcome exists).
The intuition for this result is balance of power through crowding. Suppose that an increase
in aggregate aggression ¢A > 0 causes ¯ve ¯rms to leave the market. This may be pro¯table
for e±cient (surviving) ¯rms if there are ten ¯rms to start with. To illustrate, if the sharing
9This is without loss of generality. If A = 0 is a PEP outcome at the start, entry cannot lead to a (strictly)
less aggressive outcome.
20takes the simple form of 1=º then a share 1
10¡5 is substantially bigger than 1
10. However, for x
big enough the fall in pro¯ts due to ¢A > 0 is not compensated by a gain in share from 1
10+x
to 1
10+x¡5 since limx!+1
1
10+x¡5 ¡ 1
10+x = 0.
Why is it important that the x new ¯rms enter with the highest e±ciency level n1? Suppose
they would all enter with some e±ciency level nx 2 [A0;n1i then for x big enough, it becomes
optimal for ¯rm 1 (and other ¯rms with ni > nx) to keep these x ¯rms out of the market by
choosing A = nx. Hence, entry by ine±cient ¯rms can lead to a more aggressive outcome in
this case. To exclude this, we consider the case where entry happens by ¯rms with e±ciency
level n1. Note that if the ¯rms enter with e±ciency levels below A0, there is going to be no
e®ect on the PEP outcome. Since it was not optimal before to lower A below A0, it is certainly
not optimal now because even more ¯rms would become active if A is reduced to such low
levels. Finally, if the new ¯rms enter with e±ciency levels above n1 they may be so much more
e±cient than 1 that they want to push 1 from the market as well. That would imply that entry
makes the outcome more aggressive because it does not create a balance of power. In fact, in
that case entry upsets the balance.
Summarizing, we get that entry leads to a less aggressive outcome if it creates a balance of
power. This happens if the entrants' e±ciency levels are close (or equal) to that of the leaders
in the industry.
Finally, we consider the case where an increase in entry cost f leads to a more aggressive
outcome. This result we derive for a pricing game for two reasons. First, as f changes, the
limit action to keep the marginal entrant out changes. The question then is: how should
the vector of individual actions a change to get to the new (lower) limit level A = G(a)?
The structure introduced above is insu±cient to answer this question and considerably more
structure is needed to analyze this. However, in a pricing game (with homogenous goods and
constant marginal costs, as above) the relation between the aggregate aggression level to keep
21the marginal entrant out and individual actions is very simple: all active players charge the
limit price. Second, the intuition for the e®ect of f on the aggregate outcome is naturally
described in terms of a mark up. Higher f allows for a higher mark up while keeping the
marginal entrant out. This higher mark up leads to a bigger increase in pro¯ts if the market is
shared with fewer ¯rms. Moreover, pricing games are, in fact, an important class of games in
economics.
We assume that demand is of the form D(p) with D0(p) < 0 and ¯rm i has constant marginal
cost ci which is weakly increasing in i. Then the limit price pi to keep ¯rm i out is implicitly
de¯ned by
qD(pi)(pi ¡ ci) = f
since the Nash pro¯t for any ¯rm i > 1 equals 0.
Proposition 2 If D00(p) · 0 then an increase in f makes lower prices relatively more attrac-
tive. In particular, the increase in ¯rm i's pro¯ts due to the rise in f is higher for lower values
of p (assuming ci < p).
This proposition gives conditions under which a rise in ¯xed costs makes lower prices rel-
atively more attractive. Hence it points to a tendency under which higher ¯xed costs leads
to lower prices, which is contrary conventional wisdom. The idea is that a rise in ¯xed costs
allows for a higher mark up of prices over the marginal costs of the marginal entrant. Such an
increase in mark up has a bigger positive e®ect on ¯rm i's pro¯ts if i shares the market with
fewer opponents. This is the case at lower prices. We need to exclude the case where at lower
prices an increase in the price (due to the increase in f) leads to a bigger fall in demand than at
higher prices. In that case, the increase in f would have a less bene¯cial e®ect at lower prices
than at higher prices. This case is excluded by assuming that demand D(p) is weakly concave
in p.
225. Discussion
Above we have illustrated the results using pricing games. Here we show that R&D race models
have similar properties. This illustrates that the assumptions made above are actually quite
general. We relate the results found here to the outcomes of the static Nash equilibrium and
of supergames. Finally, we relate our results to the literature on price leadership.
Consider the following static version of a patent race model. Firms invest an amount ai in
R&D. The probability that ¯rm i wins the patent is given by
ai PN
j=1 aj+¸ for some ¸ ¸ 0. We
assume pay o®s are of the form
ai
PN
j=1 aj + ¸
ni ¡ ai
where ni is the value of the patent for ¯rm i. There is an entry cost f ¸ 0. If we de¯ne A as
the average investment of the º active ¯rms (i.e. ¯rms with ai > 0), we can write i's pay o®s
as
¼(ai;A;º;ni) =
ai
ºA + ¸
ni ¡ ai
It is straightforward to check that assumption 1 is satis¯ed: ¼ is continuous in ai and A,
decreasing in A and º and increasing in e±ciency ni. This pay o® function also has the sharing
property (v) since
lim
x!+1
ai
(º+x)A+¸ni ¡ ai ¡
³
ai
(º0+x)A+¸ni ¡ ai
´
ai
(º+x)A+¸ni ¡ ai ¡
³
a0
i
(º+x)A0+¸ni ¡ a0
i
´ =
lim
x!+1
niai
³
º+x
(º+x)A+¸ ¡ º+x
(º0+x)A+¸
´
ai(º+x)
(º+x)A+¸ni ¡
a0
i(º+x)
(º+x)A0+¸ni ¡ (º + x)(ai ¡ a0
i)
= 0
for º0 6= º and (a0
i;A0) 6= (ai;A). Finally, we check whether assumption 2 is satis¯ed. Take an
arbitrary sustainable (a1;:::;an) such that A = 1
º
Pº
j=1 aj Then consider a sustainable A0 = ³A
with ³ 2 h0;1i and a0
i = ³ai. Assumption 2 is satis¯ed if
³ai
º³A+¸ni ¡ ³ai is decreasing in ³. To
23characterize this, we need to de¯ne the monopoly action am
i of ¯rm i. This is de¯ned as follows
a
m
i = argmax
a
a
a + ¸
ni ¡ a
It is the action taken by i if it is the only ¯rm in the market. Using this, one can show that
@
³
³ai
º³A+¸ni ¡ ³ai
´
@³
< 0
as long as º³A > am
i . That is, the current total investments exceed the monopoly investment
of ¯rm i for each active ¯rm i.
There are a number of ways in which the static game can be repeated. There may be a
number of innovations that have to be made and the ¯rms have a race every period for the
next innovation. Or there is one innovation and there is a probability q that there is a scienti¯c
breakthrough this period such that the innovation is found and pay o®s are realized. The
expected duration of the patent race is then 1=q. Both set ups create a dynamic structure
such that the results derived above apply: entry by e±cient ¯rms can lead to lower R&D
investments.
This patent race model can also be used to describe certain sport games. If we denote the
value of winning by V and the athlete's e®ort during the race by ai then pay o®s can be written
as
ai PN
j=1 ajV ¡
ai
ni where ni is the quality of the athlete. By increasing your e®ort during the race,
you increase the probability of winning but it is not necessarily the case that the player with the
highest e®ort wins with probability one. Of course, in sport events an important determinant
is the shape of the day for the athletes, e.g. having 'good legs' in cycling. This suggests that
the values ni are known to player i but the opponents only know the distribution from which
ni is drawn. Analyzing the signalling game that follows from this is beyond the scope of this
paper. Here we just want to point out that there is a formalization of sport tournaments that
satis¯es the assumptions made above.
24Second, how do the results derived above relate to the results of the static Nash equilibrium
and of supergame outcomes. The games analyzed here include games with upward sloping
reaction functions. In these games, the Nash equilibrium has the property that more players
lead to more aggressive outcomes. This prediction goes against the crowding e®ect described
here which leads to less aggressive outcomes as the result of entry. In the supergame version of
the game analyzed here, the main result is that more ¯rms in the market makes collusion harder
to sustain. Hence the outcome becomes 'less collusive' (more aggressive) as the result of entry.
The only caveat is that entry may lead to more aggressive punishment phases and thereby may
make it possible to sustain more collusive outcomes. This is a comparative static exercise on
the set of sustainable prices. In contrast, we have considered the e®ect on the attractiveness of
di®erent sustainable outcomes.
Finally, in pricing games there is a literature on price leadership. From the set of sustainable
prices, the price leader chooses the one that maximizes its pro¯ts taking the reaction of the
other ¯rms into account. This is another way to select an equilibrium outcome than the PEP
outcome. We argue that the main result derived above applies here as well. In this literature,
the price leader is determined in an industry by the following factors. First, in Rotemberg and
Saloner (1990) the better informed ¯rm (about demand conditions in the industry) becomes
price leader. Second, in Kirkman and Schueller (1990) a ¯rm is price leader in his home country
(in an international context where a country has at most one home producer of the product).
Third, in Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) the ¯rm with the biggest capacity is price leader and
in Deneckere, Kovenock and Lee (1992) the ¯rm with the largest segment of loyal consumers is
price leader. In the set up above, we would argue that the leading ¯rm in the industry chooses
an action pro¯le that is sustainable and that maximizes its own pro¯ts taking entry behavior
by other ¯rms into account. In other words, the leader i chooses a to solve
max
a2A
¼(ai;G(a);º(G(a));ni)
25It is routine to check that the proof of proposition 1 applies to this selection of the market
outcome as well. Hence the same balance of power intuition applies in markets where a price
leader (or group of price leaders) selects the industry outcome. Also in these markets there is
a tendency for entry by e±cient ¯rms to lead to less aggressive outcomes.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have formalized the balance of power intuition. The outcome of a game
becomes less aggressive as players cluster around the highest e±ciency level in the group of
players. This can happen because of entry by such e±cient players. Similar arguments can be
made for e±ciency gains by existing players.
To derive the balance of power result, we make three basic assumptions on the static game.
First, players' pay o®s are decreasing in the aggregate aggression level of the outcome. Second,
more aggression can eliminate an opponent from the market and a higher aggression level is
needed to eliminate more e±cient players. Third, agents are in a 'sharing' game.
Our claim is that many games in real life have this structure. Consider, for instance, the
cold war between the US and the USSR. The battle was over spheres of in°uence. In a direct
open con°ict, the country with the biggest military strength would probably have won. But
the pay o® would have been related to the di®erences in military strengths (e±ciency). The US
and USSR did pick ¯ghts with countries that they considered a lot weaker than they were. But
there was (fortunately) never an open con°ict between the US and USSR. One explanation is
the balance of power between them. This paper argues that one should then expect a relatively
peaceful outcome if there is a balance of power.
Another illustration is that Lance Armstrong does not attack in °at stages in the Tour de
France because ability di®erences are small between him and his opponents. In the mountains
26the di®erences in ability are bigger and hence he attacks there. One should expect more
aggressive strategies and outcomes when the di®erence between e±ciency (ability) levels goes
up.
Going back to economics, in competition policy there is also the idea that more symmetric
¯rms cause prices to be higher. This is referred to as coordinated e®ects or joint dominance.
As mentioned in the introduction, joint dominance has been formalized by showing that asym-
metries between ¯rms make it harder to sustain a collusive outcome. We have shown that
aggressive play becomes less pro¯table as ¯rms cluster around the highest e±ciency level in the
industry.
The main implication for empirical research is that not only the average e±ciency level
matters in determining how aggressive the outcome is. Higher moments of the e±ciency dis-
tribution are important as well. It is these higher moments that reveal how big the gaps are
between ¯rms' e±ciency levels and whether there is a balance of power.
Finally, the results point to the following policy implications. In a joint dominance or
coordinated e®ects case where a merger between two ¯rms brings the merged entity towards
the technological frontier in the industry, there is indeed reason to consider the e®ects. Normally
such e±ciency gains are seen as an argument in favor of the merger (the so called e±ciency
defence). But if such a merger creates a balance of power by increasing the number of ¯rms at
the technological frontier there is a chance that the outcome becomes less aggressive and prices
become higher. As argued by Motta (2004) it is hard, if not impossible, to punish tacit collusion.
Hence a competition authority may chose to prevent it from happening in the ¯rst place. This
can involve forbidding a merger if it creates a balance of power in the industry. This only
applies to industries where tacit collusion is likely. Posner (2001) and Motta (2004) describe
lists of characteristics that make industries susceptible to collusion. Moreover, stimulating entry
or reducing entry barriers in such industries may not have the desired e®ects of disciplining
27incumbents. Both policy measures can in fact have the perverse e®ect of raising prices. Thus,
if it is hard or even impossible for a competition authority to ¯ght and prevent tacit collusion,
mergers creating a balance of power should be prevented.
Another implication is that in order to make the Tour de France more lively and attractive
again, one should consider reducing the number of cyclists that are allowed to start. Having
fewer high quality cyclists reduces the crowding e®ect and hence the outcome may become more
aggressive.
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Appendix A. Proofs of results
Proof of Lemma 1 Choose an arbitrary vector ® 2 IR
N
++ and consider the following family
of optimization problems
(Pº) max
a1;:::;aº;A2Cº
º X
i=1
®i¼(ai;A;º;ni)
for º = 1;:::;N with
Cº =
8
> > <
> > :
(a;A) 2 IR
º+1
+
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
¼(ai;A;º;ni) ¸ q¼(Ri(A);A;º;ni) + (1 ¡ q)¼NE(ni)
i = 1;:::;º
q¼(Rº+1(A);A;º + 1;nº+1) + (1 ¡ q)¼NE(nº+1) · f
G(a) = A
9
> > =
> > ;
Since (by assumption) there exists a Nash equilibrium of the static game, we know that
the set A is non empty and hence for at least one value of º the set Cº is nonempty. Note
that by the continuity assumptions on the functions ¼(:);G(:) and R(:) the sets Cº are closed.
Further, the only relevant values for A lie in the interval [0;n1] and we assumed that actions
ai are chosen from a bounded set. Hence, the sets Cº are, in fact, compact.
It follows that a problem (Pº) maximizes a continuous function on a compact set. Hence
if (Cº) is non empty, it follows from the Weierstrass theorem that (Pº) has a global solution
(maximum). Therefore at least one of the problems (Pº) has a solution, but possibly more.
Let Sº denote the set of solutions to problem Pº. That is,
a 2 Sº if (a;A) 2 argmax(a0;A0)2Cº
º X
i=1
®i¼(a
0
i;A
0;º;ni)
30We de¯ne S as the union of the sets Sº, i.e. S =
SN
º=1 Sº.
We use the following procedure to ¯nd a candidate PEP outcome. From all the solutions
in S choose the one(s) with the highest value for ¼(a1;A;º;n1). This set is denoted by Sf1g.If
there is only one such solution, this is our candidate PEP outcome and we denote it by ~ a. If
there are more solutions yielding the same maximum pay o® for player 1, then choose among
these solutions in Sf1g, the solution that maximizes the pay o® of player 2. This subset is
denoted Sf1;2g. If this is a singleton, it is our candidate ~ a, if not move on to player 3's pay o®
to determine the set Sf1;2;3g etc. until only one candidate solution is left (if one has moved on
to player N and still is there a number of solutions left in Sf1;:::;Ng, pick an arbitrary one in this
set).
Now we will argue that ~ a and ~ A = G(~ a) form indeed a PEP outcome. Suppose not, that is
suppose there exists a0 and A0 = G(a0) such that
¼(a
0
i;A
0;º(A
0);ni) ¸ ¼(~ ai; ~ A;º( ~ A);ni)
for all i = 1;:::;minfº(A0);º( ~ A)g with a strict inequality for ¯rm j. If j · º( ~ A) then ~ a
cannot have been an element of Sf1;:::;jg. This contradicts the way in which ~ a was obtained.
If º( ~ A) < j · º(A0) then both ~ a and a0 were in the set Sf1;:::;j¡1g. However, in the next step
~ a should have been deleted. In either case we get a contradiction with the way we found ~ a.
Hence ~ a and ~ A = G(~ a) form indeed a PEP outcome. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1 Take an arbitrary a 2 A with G(a) = A > A0 and take a
sustainable A0 < A0 which exists by assumption. Then assumption 2 tells us that there exists
a0 2 A with G(a0) = A0 such that ¼(a0
i;A0;º(A);ni) > ¼(ai;A;º(A);ni). In fact, for any x > 0
we can ¯nd a0
x and ax with G(a0
x) = A0 < G(ax) = A such that
¼(a
0
xi;A
0;º(A) + x;ni) > ¼(axi;A;º(A) + x;ni) (A.1)
31We need to show that for x big enough we have
¼(a
0
xi;A
0;º(A
0) + x;ni) > ¼(axi;A;º(A) + x;ni)
This can be written as
¼(a
0
xi;A
0;º(A) + x;ni) ¡ ¼(axi;A;º(A) + x;ni) > (A.2)
¼(a
0
xi;A
0;º(A) + x;ni) ¡ ¼(a
0
xi;A
0;º(A
0) + x;ni) (A.3)
Using equation (A.1) we can write this as
1 >
¼(a0
xi;A0;º(A) + x;ni) ¡ ¼(a0
xi;A0;º(A0) + x;ni)
¼(a0
xi;A0;º(A) + x;ni) ¡ ¼(axi;A;º(A) + x;ni)
This inequality holds for x big enough since the right hand side converges to zero by assumption
1 (v). Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2 Firm º is the least e±cient ¯rm that can still enter if qD(¹ pº+1)(¹ pº+1¡
cº+1) = f. This (implicitly) de¯nes the limit price ¹ pº+1 to keep º +1 out of the market. Using
the implicit function theorem, we ¯nd
(D
0(¹ pº+1)(¹ pº+1 ¡ cº+1) + D(¹ pº+1))
d¹ pº+1
df
=
1
q
Hence, for each ¯rm i · º we ¯nd that
d¼(¹ pº+1;º;ci)
df
=
1
º
(D
0(¹ pº+1)(¹ pº+1 ¡ ci) + D(¹ pº+1))
d¹ pº+1
df
(A.4)
=
1
ºq
D0(¹ pº+1)(¹ pº+1 ¡ ci) + D(¹ pº+1)
D0(¹ pº+1)(¹ pº+1 ¡ cº+1) + D(¹ pº+1)
(A.5)
where ¼(p;º;ci) = D(p)(p ¡ ci)=º. Now we compare the expression for
d¼i
df at ¹ pº+1 and at a
lower value ¹ pj+1 for j < º. Then we see the following three e®ects working in the direction of
d(¼(¹ pj+1;j;ci) ¡ ¼(¹ pº+1;º;ci))
df
> 0
32or equivalently
1
jq
D0(¹ pj+1)(¹ pj+1 ¡ ci) + D(¹ pj+1)
D0(¹ pj+1)(¹ pj+1 ¡ cj+1) + D(¹ pj+1)
¡
1
ºq
D0(¹ pº+1)(¹ pº+1 ¡ ci) + D(¹ pº+1)
D0(¹ pº+1)(¹ pº+1 ¡ cº+1) + D(¹ pº+1)
> 0
First, j < º implies that 1=j > 1=º. Second, cj+1 < cº+1 implies that the denominator of the
¯rst term is smaller than the denominator of the second term. Finally, consider the e®ect of p
for given º and cº+1:
@
³
D(p)+D0(p)(p¡ci)
D(p)+D0(p)(p¡cº+1)
´
@p
=
2(D0(p))2(ci ¡ cº+1) + D00(p)D(p)(cº+1 ¡ ci)
(D(p) + D0(p)(p ¡ cº+1))2
which is negative if D00(p) · 0 since cº+1 > ci. This also implies that a lower value of p leads
to a higher value of
¼i
df for each i = 1;:::;j. Q.E.D.
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